Done! And Some Papers!
Yesterday I graded like a madman in the morning and edited like a madman in the afternoon. The payoff was that I finished all of my semester’s work two days early. Yay! I wrote three seminar papers this semester. I am somewhat fond of all three. So, I put them on my website. Specifically, on my papers page.
The three papers are:
“Contractualism, Respect, and Freedom of Expression” (link)
Abstract: One prevalent view in political philosophy holds that the only justified principles are those that can be agreed to by all citizens. Another popular view is that we ought to respect people, not because of what they do, but because of what they are—viz., people. In this paper, I intend to defend a robust right to free expression. I will anchor this defense in these two familiar ideas. The resulting theory, I will argue, is a powerful one. It can provide us with a unified view of free expression while not only conforming to our intuitions, but also explaining our intuitions.
“Contextualism or Relativism? Truth-Value Determination, Sorites Arguments, and Absolute Gradable Adjectives” (link)
Abstract: One strategy to try to explain the paradoxical nature of sorites arguments is to argue for a semantics of gradable adjectives that explicates some relevant feature of all (vague) gradable adjectives that gives rise to the paradox. A semantic theory that did that would have a serious consideration in its favor. One recent foray into this game can be found in Kennedy (2007). Kennedy defends a contextualist semantics of gradable adjectives. He argues that his theory can explain the paradoxical nature of sorites arguments containing gradable adjectives. Given certain background assumptions, it seems as if he successfully carries out the strategy. However, at least one of those background assumptions is tendentious. Namely, he assumes what has come to be known epistemicism about vagueness. We might wonder, then, if there is another theory of gradable adjectives that explains the sorites paradox without assuming epistemicism. I will argue here that there is: viz., a relativistic one. I will argue that relativism about gradable adjectives akin to Richard’s (2004) view can equally or better explain everything that Kennedy’s theory does without assuming epistemicism.
“Belief, Evidence, and Practical Reasons” (link)
Abstract: My argument here will be two-fold. First, I will argue for a certain connection between theoretical rationality and practical reasons. My argument will depend on what I take to be a truism of theoretical rationality: believe (at least some of) the propositions that your evidence decisively supports. I will argue that this truism, if taken seriously, will generate a very strong pro tanto practical reason. The arguments for this conclusion will form the basis for the paper’s second main aim, which is to argue against certain conceptions of practical reasons. The practical reason supported by our theoretical truism, although prima facie very plausible, will not be supported in the right way by the teleological conception of practical reasons. This is telling against that theory, I will argue.
As always, comments welcome (erroldotlordatgmaildotcom)
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