Slaves of the Passions: Session One, “Chapter One: Reasons and the Humean Theory”
This is the first ’session’ of TEM’s reading group on Mark Schroeder’s forthcoming book Slaves of the Passions. Below the fold is my précis and some comments.
1. MS starts by introducing us to Ronnie and Bradley. Both have been invited to a party that promises to be quite the event. Naturally, dancing will be at the party. While Ronnie loves to dance, Bradley cannot stand it. Because of the nature of Ronnie’s and Bradley’s preferences, it is natural to say that Ronnie has a reason to go to the party because of the dancing and that Bradley has a reason not to go to the party because of the dancing. These particular reasons are reasons because of some feature of Ronnie’s and Bradley’s psychologies. It is widely agreed upon that some reasons are like this.
However, there is a particular theory of reasons–the Humean theory– that holds that all reasons are like this in some broad way. MS defines it thusly:
HTR*: Every reason is explained by the kind of psychological state that explains Ronnie’s reason in the same way as Ronnie’s is.
It is important to make clear that HTR* is a parity thesis, meaning that it leaves open which psychological states explain reasons. Hence, there are a multitude of possible different views that are compatible with HTR*, but differ in their explanations of which states explain reasons. On one popular view, reasons are explained by one’s desires. However, on another view reasons are explained by what one takes pleasure in. There are many other possibilities.
Not surprisingly, some of the possible views are more plausible than others. MS illustrates this by examining two different desire based theories: the holistic and the atomistic. On the holistic view, we have to look at all of Ronnie’s desires to explain the difference between his reasons and Bradley’s. So, on this view, we have to see whether going to the party will satisfy Ronnie’s desires on balance in order to see if he has a reason to go to the party. In contrast, on the atomistic view we only have to look at one desire to explain the difference. On this theory, it must only be the case that going to the party would satisfy one of Ronnie’s desires in order for him to have a reason to go.
The holistic view is open to easy counterexamples, however. Imagine the case of Ryan and Katie. Katie needs help, and Ryan can help her. On the holistic view, it must be case that helping Katie will satisfy Ryan’s desires on balance in order for him to have a reason to help. So, unless he is very altruistic, it is unlikely that he will turn out to have a reason to help Katie. However, on the atomistic view, Ryan needs to only have one desire that would be satisfied by helping Katie in order to have a reason to help. Thus, the atomistic view conforms better with our intuitions, and is prima facie better theory–even though both are Humean theories.
The book, then, is about the Humean theory of reasons. MS aims at two major things: (i) he aims at showing that all of the objections to the Humean theory of reasons are based on substantive assumptions about what psychological state explains reasons, and that once we isolate these assumptions we can see that they do not apply to all Humean theories; (ii) he aims at defending a version of the Humean theory called hypotheticalism. He holds that hypotheticalism avoids all objections to the Humean theory, is the best explanation for the difference between Ronnie’s and Bradley’s reasons, and that it is thus a serious contender for what theory is the best theory of reasons.
2. MS starts by evaluating the motivation for adopting desire as the explaining psychological state. MS claims that the main motivation comes from the classical argument (CA):
CA: 1. If something is a reason for y to do x, than that thing must able to motivate y to do x (existence internalism).
2. In order to motivated to do x, y must have a desire to do x (Humean theory of motivation).
C. In order for something to be a reason for y to do x, y must desire to do x.
MS does not think that CA is a very good argument for the Humean theory of reasons (in Chapter 11 he gives many reasons to accept the Humean theory, none having to do with existence internalism or the Humean theory of motivation). Because of his scepticism about CA, he purposefully made HTR* a parity thesis. Moreover, he made HTR* a parity thesis because we know broadly what the difference is between Bradley and Ronnie: viz., their psychological states. Now which psychological states is obviously a key question, along with the question as to whether or not all reasons are explained in this way.
MS next explores philosophical reasons why we should interested in whether the Humean theory is true. The first, and indeed the most important, is that if the Humean theory is true, then the objective prescriptivity of morality seems to be threatened. It is plausible to think that morality gives people reasons for action (thus, it is prescriptive), and that these reasons apply to everyone (thus, they are objective). However, if HTR is true, then it is hard to see how morality can be like this. This is because it seems unlikely that anything can be a reason for everyone on HTR, for in order for something to be a reason for everyone, everyone must have the same psychological state in response to that thing. This seems unlikely.
Note that this worry about HTR does not presuppose a particular substantive story about which psychological state explains reasons. Thus, if we are interested in HTR’s implications for morality, we should case our nets wide and be concerned with HTR as a parity thesis.
Let me add here that this is the reason why I think HTR must be false–although I am willing to suspend my scepticism until the end of this book.
Partially in spite of that conversation, MS stipulates that he will use ‘desire’ as an abbreviation of ‘whatever psychological state explains reasons’. This let’s state the Humean theory in more familiar terms:
HTR: Every reason is explained by a desire in the same way as Ronnie’s is (9).
3. Before we get to HTR, MS feels that he must clear up some confusion about reason talk and specify what realm of reason talk HTR applies to. In short, HTR applies to objective normative reasons. Objective normative reasons are the reasons that someone has independent of one’s beliefs and solely dependent on the facts. It does not, then, apply to explanatory reasons (I will leave it to the reader to explore what that means).
Traditionally, there have been two distinct types of normative reasons: objective and subjective. Objective is the sense outlined above. Subjective normative reasons are reasons one has that count in favor of an action based on one’s beliefs, (possibly) independent of how things are. MS defines it this way:
SR: For R to be a subjective reason for X to do A is for X to believe R, and for it to be the case that R is the kind of thing, if true, to be an objective reason for X to do A (13).
Based on this, he defines what a motivating reason is:
MR: For R to be the (motivating) reason for which X did A is for the fact that R was a subjective normative reason for X to do A to constitute an explanatory reason why X did A (ibid).
Thus, since MR is based on SR, and SR is based on objective normative reasons, MS takes objective normative reasons to be the most fundamental.
Let me just say that I think it is a mistake to say that all things that satisfy SR are actual reasons. Take Williams’s famous petrol example. When what is in front of you is not in fact gin, but petrol, I think you have no normative reason whatsoever to drink what is in front of you. You may have a seeming reason because you think that what is in front of you is gin. Thus, you might not be open to rational criticism for drinking what is in front of you. However, I think that it is wrong to say you have an actual normative reason. This is because reasons are relational properties between true propositions (or, if you prefer, facts) and agents. When there is no true proposition that counts in favor of drinking what’s in front of you, then you have no normative reason whatsoever. We are unnecessarily broadening our ontology if we say all things that satisfy SR are actual reasons.
4. In the final section, MS looks at the different uses of objective normative reason talk. The samples he is most interested in are expressed by the following sentences:
5 The fact that there will be dancing at the party is a reason for Ronnie to
go to the party.6 There is a reason for Ronnie to go to the party.
7 The fact that Katie needs help is a reason to help Katie.
8 There is a reason to help Katie (14-15).
6 seems to be true because 5 is. MS assumes this throughout the book. The feature that he wishes to explore here, though, is the fact that 5 and 6 seem to be agent-relational, meaning that an agent is one of the relata. However, 7 and 8 seem to be agent-neutral, meaning that there is no place for an agent as one of the relata. These differences are represented by the triadic and dyadic formulations:
TF (agent-relational): X is a reason for Y to φ.
DF (agent-neutral): X is a reason to φ.
What the relationship between TF and DF is is an interesting question in-itself. MS has a novel answer: he holds that the DF relation is to be understood as a universal quantification on the agent spot of the TF relation. So, sentences like 7 are to be understood as saying that there is a reason for everyone to help Katie. The ‘everyone’ is context-sensitive, however. This allows us to assimilate claims like 7 with the following type of case:
We’re deciding whether to go to the party tonight, we all like to dance, and our plans are independent of Bradley’s. Someone says, ‘one reason to go to the party is that there will be dancing there’ (17).
When that person says that ‘one reason to go to the party is that there will be dancing there,’ she does not mean that there is a reason simpliciter to go there. She just means that everyone in her group has a reason to go because of the dancing. Thus, her universal quantification is only relevant to those in her group. In some contexts, particularly moral contexts, one’s universal quantification is plausibly over everyone.
This is a very powerful argument, and I have a hard time seeing how it could be false.
So, with those arguments in hand, we can be more precise about what HTR is seeking to explain: the triadic relation of objective normative reasons.
I will end with an important distinction that will play a role in chapter 2: that of explanation v. the source. MS claims that the existence of some psychological state explains one’s reasons. He does not claim, however, that the existence of some psychological state constitutes one’s reasons. So, this means that HTR can still cite facts in the world as the originators of reasons. However, HTR must hold that in order for there to be a reason, one must be in a certain psychological state. In other words, the psychological state is a necessary condition for there being a reason, but not a sufficient one (right?). This in-itself alleviates many common worries. For example, it can explain why some subjective normative reasons are not objective normative reasons (because one of the other necessary conditions is not met–namely, the truth condition).
sorry to be so late. here is one issue. more later hopefully.
i think MR is prima faciea implausible. it seems to me that this formulation will have trouble with cases of weakness of will. let me first say what i mean by weakness of will and why i think MR seems like it would have trouble with it. by weakness of will (or i guess one form of it) i have in mind a situation in which the following is true of some agent S:
(i) S believes (lets say she is justified and truly believes this as well) that R is not an objective normative reason for S to do A
(ii) S As
(iii) R is S’s motivating reason for A-ing.
as far as i can tell, this schema is straightforwardly inconsistent with MR. i think this is the case because (iii) satisfies the antecedent of MR (its not quite in this form but I think it can be re-written this way. by antecedent I mean what is in the first “for” clause) and (i) is the negation of the consequent of MR (here i mean everything starting from and to the right of the “is for the fact” part). (i) is the negation of the consequent because (i) makes it false to say that “R was the subjective normative reason for S to do A” as (i) shows that R is not the kind of thing which if true is an objective normative reason (this is the, in my terms, consequent of SR which I understand (like MR) as a bi-conditional). now, there is room left here because perhaps these formulations are not bi-conditionals though the formulations strike me as such because their use of “is for.”
now, my formulation of weakness of will is, of course, open to dispute as well. though i think it can be given (an would require, if this were worry were to be developed into an objection to schroeder’s view) independent motivation, i won’t try to do that here. instead, ill give an example in hopes that I can at least hint at why its intuitive. Imagine the case of depression. A depressed person (S) might find herself in this situation. She believes that the fact (R) that lying in bed all day will prevent her from seeing anyone or doing anything is not a reason to lie in bed all day (A). Suppose she is justified in having this belief and that this belief is true. She might nonetheless lie in bed all day due to that very fact (R). There are options about how to understand situations like this, but I think this is the natural reading. There are three (immediately obvious to me at least) ways that cases like this (that is the real world cases that this idealized case was meant to be based on) might be analyzed to make them amenable to schroeder’s view. First, Schroeder could deny that (i) is true in cases like this. I think (i) is intuitive but, one thing I should say at the outsight, is that Schroeder does have in print an argument which suggests that our intuitions about (i)-type reasons judgment (negative existential as he calls them) are unreliable. in any case, i doubt very much that anything hangs on this way of framing the objection (consider that it could be rewritten with a judgment like the fact that (R) S will be able to talk to his friends is a reason for S to go out today (A)). The second move that Schroeder could make is deny (iii) by claiming S really lies in bed all day due to some other consideration. Maybe R is the fact that she wants to stay in bed. This seems like something Schroeder might want to say. I doubt that this analysis is a good one though as we need to claim that this fact provides S with a subjective normative reason to stay in bed. And I doubt that this is right as, it seems to me, considering what it is like to feel depressed would show (similar things hold for why I think (iii) is true in the first place). The last obvious move Schroeder could make is to claim that weakness of will is not possible really agents are only compulsive or reckless. In particular, cases like the depression one I’m talking about lend themselves to the reading of compulsiveness most readily. The argument here would be to deny that (iii) is true again, but this time to say that S’s motivating reason is not R rather S’s explanatory (an not motivating) reason for A-ing is R. Here, Schroeder would have to spell out this distinction in some independently plausible way that would still lend itself to his purposes. One thought is that we can distinguish them in the way Scanlon distinguishes operative from explanatory reasons. To roughly illustrate this, we might say something like this. It might be true that the reason why the Menendez brothers killed their parents is something related to their Oedipal complexes or due to certain neurons firing, but both of these seem quite implausible as their operative reasons. Instead, it seems like these reasons, though they do explain, are not operative as these weren’t the sort of things that, to put it very crudely, were before the brothers minds when they decided to kill their parents like, say, the fact that they hated them. Another way of drawing the contrast is as a matter of freedom of the will. We might say that weakness of will and motivating reasons require that S be free. If S is not free, then they are compulsive and explanatory reasons are relevant. I think this second way of drawing the contrast between reasons is not plausible (though I think it is the common sense way of distinguishing compulsion and weakness of will which, if true would seem to indicate that the distinction between reasons and not the distinction between rational failures is primary). Regardless, I think that nothing of the intuitive force of the case is lost by stipulating that the agent is free (in whatever way normal agents who sometimes have to struggle to do what they judge they should are at least) and by stipulating that the very consideration before S’s mind was the fact that she would not see anyone or do anything all day if she were to stay in bed. In fact, I think we should say something stronger: not only is the situation possible, but it is the most natural way to understand what actually does happen to depressed people (at least those not severely depressed).
Like I’ve hinted at this is not an objection yet and would require a lot of development to get there, but I think it is a cause for concern. Of course, there are other options (perhaps I am not thinking carefully about whether this is a semantic, metaphysical, or epistemological thesis) which might solve the problem. And, of course, Schroeder has a lot left to say on the topic. But, this is one initial worry of mine. I wonder what y’all think. I probably am missing something obvious. I’d like to, time permitting, post a bit later about some other issues as well, but that is to be seen.
Shyam,
First I am going to recap what you said in order to make sure I am clear on everything. First we have the akrasia case:
(i) S believes (lets say she is justified and truly believes this as well) that R is not an objective normative reason for S to do A
(ii) S As
(iii) R is S’s motivating reason for A-ing.
So, we can turn the case into a reductio argument by putting in some of MS’s definitions.
(1) For R to be a subjective reason for S to do A is for S to believe R, and for it to be the case that R is the kind of thing, if true, to be an objective reason for S to do A.
is true:
S does not believe R is an objective reason to A (negation of 6’s consequent).
(2) For R to be the (motivating) reason for which S did A is for the fact that R was a subjective normative reason for S to do A to constitute an explanatory reason why S did A.
Suppose the following:
(3) S believes (let’s say she is justified and truly believes this as well) that not seeing anyone or doing anything is not an objective normative reason for S to do lie in bed all day.
(4) S lies in bed all day.
(5) Not seeing anyone or doing anything is S’s motivating reason for lying in bed all day.
From (1) we can get the following:
(6) If R is a subjective reason for S to do A, then S believes R and R would be an objective normative reason for S to A if R is true.
From (2) we get the following:
(7) If R is a motivating reason for S to do A, then R is a subjective reason for S and S does A because of R.
By stipulation, (
(
Thus,
(9) R is not a subjective reason for S.
Therefore,
(10) R is not a motivating reason for S to do A.
(10) and (5) contradict each other. We can either reject (1) or (2). (1) seems pretty solid, so we ought to reject (2), which is MR.
Next, you give three ways that MS could resist this conclusion. First, he could deny that (3) is true in this type of akrasia case. Now, you cite his negative existential argument as a possible move here, but I don’t see it. In the negative existential case, MS argues that it is fallacious make the following type of claim, “there is no reason whatsoever to phi.” That is not what (3) says, though. (3) just cites one reason to get out of bed. I don’t think the negative existential route is open to MS in denying (3). Moreover, I think that you can stipulate (3) however you want.
Second, MS could deny that (5) is true of a person in the case. The person’s motivating reason might instead be that she wants to stay in bed, or whatever. Again, this would not be a very satisfying answer because (i) you are free to stipulate what S’s motivating reason is as long as it seems possible that your stipulation could be someone’s motivating reason and (ii) your stipulation seems like it could be someone’s motivating reason.
The third route you suggest is that MS might claim that akrasia is not really possible–agents are either compulsive or reckless. I don’t know exactly what you mean by this; however, all routes that you suppose for MS in this section seem to be pretty implausible.
I think that this is a real worry. I also think that it is straight-forwardly a metaphysical worry. That is, it is about one’s judgments about what reasons one actually has and how those judgments relate to actions; viz., actions where weakness of the will is present.
off hand i think your presentation is on track. the three routes i offer i also find implausible. i mention them because all of them have, in fact, have been taken by philosophers. i cant think of the citations of hand, but a good place to look are at the targets michael stocker takes in his paper “desiring the bad.”
if i read you properly you take it that the problem i mention is a real one?
as for the comment about what type of worry the one i presented is, i agree it is metaphyical. i take it that this sentence prompted ur comment:
perhaps I am not thinking carefully about whether this is a semantic, metaphysical, or epistemological thesis
the thesis i had in mind here was not the one i was forwarding, but rather i was talking about what the status of schroeders MR, SR etc are. ultimately, i dont know if this will matter.
at any rate, im sure schroeder will explicitly offer some account of weakness of will so my comment is premature at best. regardless sorry for the unclear and typo ridden presentation above. i wrote it very quickly as i was so late getting to this.
Shyam,
I think that MR, SR, and OR are all metaphysical theses. Although, as I said above, I don’t think that we should say that all things that satisfy SR are really normative reasons. But we can just ignore that.
Yes, I think that your objection is cause for real alarm. I also agree that MS must have some story later on about this because the contradiction in MR is pretty apparent without such a story.
Hi Errol, I apologize for being so late to the party. In your synopsis of chapter one, you raise a quick criticism that I think is generated from two reasons: (i) you assume that psychological states can’t be facts and (ii) you assume that having more than one of the same thing counts as bloating our ontology.
In the synopsis you write:
“Let me just say that I think it is a mistake to say that all things that satisfy SR are actual reasons. Take Williams’s famous petrol example. When what is in front of you is not in fact gin, but petrol, I think you have no normative reason whatsoever to drink what is in front of you. You may have a seeming reason because you think that what is in front of you is gin. Thus, you might not be open to rational criticism for drinking what is in front of you. However, I think that it is wrong to say you have an actual normative reason. This is because reasons are relational properties between true propositions (or, if you prefer, facts) and agents. When there is no true proposition that counts in favor of drinking what’s in front of you, then you have no normative reason whatsoever. We are unnecessarily broadening our ontology if we say all things that satisfy SR are actual reasons.”
First, the claim is that the belief/desire pair would be a reason for him to drink what’s in the glass, had his belief/desire pair been true. This is, I take it, is the crux of Hypotheticalism(I’m sure I’m wrong about this. If I am, maybe it’s a different view that I should pursue on my own.). It is a reason for me, if and only if two things are true (i) the fact that I am in the appropriate psychological state, and (ii) the fact that my belief/desire pair would be satisfied by doing the action.
Let’s apply it to the BW case: Had the bottle been full of gin, then the fact that my psychological state is such that I desire gin counts as a reason for me to drink what’s in the glass. In fact, it is a normative reason, given that SNRs are built out of ONRs(Notice how the hypothetical situation where the psychological state obtains in the world mirrors the claim about ONRs in the chapter.). So, it passes the test. In part, it seems that there is an assumption, made by you, that reasons are relational properties between true propositions. This excludes the fact that a person is in a particular psychological state that seems like a robust and important fact about the world(the reason for this comes in Chapter two. We can fight about that later if you want.).
Second, it seems unclear why we are broadening our ontology. If we are talking about the same thing, reasons, and we have a lot of ways of talking about the same thing, then it seems like we aren’t broadening our ontology. According to MS, they are not separate kinds of reasons, there are different ways of speaking about reasons.
If I’ve misunderstood the criticism, let me know.
Cullen,
Let’s start with the assumptions you attribute to me:
“(i) you assume that psychological states can’t be facts and (ii) you assume that having more than one of the same thing counts as bloating our ontology.”
I assume by (i) you mean that I assume that there aren’t facts about psychological states. That is false. I don’t think psychological states are facts. I think that there are facts about psychological states, however. Moreover, I think that some of those facts obviously play a role in normative reason talk. The cases of Ronnie and Bradley show that much. Moreover, after chapter 2, I think that hypotheticalism might be on the right track. This is because it seems to do a good job explaining what the ‘person-half’ of the reason relation is. We often speak of the relational quality of normative reasons and facts. In those discussions, the fact half of the relation is always what is stressed. However, I don’t think I have ever seen an account of the person half of the relation. That is, what is it about people that puts them in these relations with certain facts? Hypotheticalism can answer this, it seems to me, by pointing to the necessary ‘desire’ state. Moreover, by stressing that the desire isn’t the reason, but merely a background condition, hypotheticalism can also stress the fact half of the relation.
All of that being said, however, I still don’t think that everything that satisfies SR should be called a normative reason. Certainly, when there is gin in the bottle, you have a reason to drink. But that is because the fact half of the relation actually obtains (and is thus a ONR). However, SR is satisfied even when the bottle is full of petrol. That means that MS’s theory holds that you have a normative reason to drink the petrol. I think that is wrong because the fact half of the relation does not obtain.
W/r/t (ii), I don’t know exactly what you mean. By what you say later on, I assume you mean the following: postulating that there is more than one kind of the same phenomenon bloats our ontology. I think this is false as well. I think it is right to say that there is form of reason in the petrol case. However, I don’t think there is a normative reason. Perhaps there are explanatory and motivating reasons, but not normative reasons.