Yes, I think that it is a general problem with FMSOs. It is more acutely a problem when K is the most general FMSO. My point above was just that you cannot cite the structure of other FMSOs to explain away the strangeness of the sandwich. In fact, it seems pretty tough for TW to cite other evidence to neutralize the strangeness. The strategy he does adopt–analogy–is probably the best way to go. However, I think the analogy fails.

You’re right that it is going to turn on the externalism/internalism issue. I look forward to that debate, and I look forward to your précis tomorrow.

Would you agree that the problem, then, is how a mental state can be factive in the first place? It seems that any FMSO will present a similar “sandwich” problem for us, and any FMSO will impose the non-mental “truth” condition. The problem of how (ii) is present in all things that satisfy (i) is therefore a problem of how a mental state can be factive, that is, of how a mental state can be such that it provides us with a non-mental condition (truth) in all cases.

If you do, then I think I agree : I am having a hard time wrapping my mind around how a mental state can be factive, and thus lead to non-mental conditions in all cases. Presumably TW’s answer lies in his commitment to externalism (which we’ll cover in the next two chapters). If internalism is true, then mental states are all contained solely in the head, and it seems incoherent to maintain that these mental states could always lead to non-mental conditions. If internalism is false, though, then mental states are not just physical brain states but also “something else” about the world external to ourselves. So even if FMSOs cannot be reduced to neat mental and non-mental components, perhaps this “something else” could still suffice to ground a non-mental condition for the various FMSOs.

“So, on the one hand it seems like we should get a similar sandwich for every FMSO (as long as the FMSO entails us having some other mental state as well).”

Like you point out, this is not going to help with the puzzle. This is because every other FMSO’s sandwich is going to be the same know’s (I think). The other relevant mental state is going to be belief, and the non-mental condition is going to be truth. So, for ‘remember’:

(i*) The state of remembering phi.
(ii*) The state of truly believing that phi happened.
(iii*) the state of believing phi happened.

This is just the same as the knows case, and, at least to me, it is just as paradoxical.

Here is why these sandwiches are paradoxical to me. It is because of the conceptual connections between (i) and (ii). It is odd to me that (ii) must be present in all things that satisfy (i), yet (ii) is non-mental and (i) is mental. I think that that idea borders on incoherent. Moreover, I don’t think TW’s analogy works (for the reasons Lowe points out). Thus, I am left puzzled by the sandwich.

I am planning on replying to your post. It might be a day or two, though.

Thanks for indulging my question .

Anyways, as for a connection between two mental states that fulfill a similar “sandwich,” I would think any of the “could x” FMSOs would serve such a function, where “x” would be the other mental state in conjunction with “truly.” Consider “could feel”

1) She could feel that that her bone was broken
2) She felt that her bone was broken and her bone really was broken
3) She felt that her bone was broken.

2) necessarily follows given 1) if “could feel” is a FMSO (if it is factive, then it is true that the bone is broken) and the mental state “could feel” entails the (different, non-factive) mental state “felt.” 3) trivially follows from 2).

The above looks like it satisfies the sandwiching conditions, right? It relies on us classifying “could feel” and “felt” differently, as TW does, and considering “could feel” to be an FMSO. So, on the one hand it seems like we should get a similar sandwich for every FMSO (as long as the FMSO entails us having some other mental state as well).

On the other hand, this probably doesn’t help all that much, since the “could feel” example is likely just as problematic as the “knows” case. I think this might point to an answer : it isn’t that K is a kind of TB, but rather that B is a kind of K (a botched kind, according to TW). This explains the B part, given K. K is also factive according to TW, and necessarily a factive attitude is one we only have to truths. So this explains the T part. Put them together in a conjunction and we get the non-mental state TB. Does that sketch sound promising?

I think the main issue is how mental states can be factive. If a mental state X is factive (and thus entails truth), and that mental state X entails some other mental state Y, then a factive mental state X will necessarily give us “Y & true.” And, of course, if we have “Y & true” we get “Y” for free (and the bottom half of the mental sandwich). I guess I don’t think the problem is really “the sandwich” but rather whether a mental state can simultaneously entail some other mental state as well as some non-mental condition. If so, there is no paradox (the other mental state in the non-mental-state conjunction will trivially entail itself). If not, then TW is in trouble.

In other words, I think if we grant TW that there are factive mental states, then we should also grant him that there will be “mental/non-mental/mental” sandwiches. But I also feel like I might be missing something.

Here’s another drive-by posting. See if this makes any sense. I have a funny feeling that I’ve missed something obvious…

I’ve been mulling over your question–what’s so paradoxical about mental/non-mental/mental sandwiching? I guess my problem has to do with the “top” of the sandwich–true belief being a necessary condition for knowledge.

On Williamson’s view, knowledge isn’t a kind of true belief, but there is a necessary condition between K and TB. My question is this: what explains that necessary connection? Is it just a brute fact that there is such a connection? Or is a better explanation that K is a kind of TB? Think back to Williamson’s example about being red and being coloured. Necessarily, anything that’s red is coloured. That connection would seem awfully strange if we didn’t have the simple explanation that we do–red is a kind of color. But on Williamson’s view, there’s a necessary connection between two kinds of (at least partially mental) states—K and TB–that doesn’t get explained in this way or any other; that strikes me as weird. That’s partially because I can’t think of another necessary connection b/w two mental states that’s not explained by appeal to the fact that one is just a particular kind of the other; can anyone think of such an example?

(Interesting thought: one might object by saying that seeing and remembering are such states (recall Williamson’s stuff about K being the most general FMSO—that provides the necessary connection between those and K). But I can respond by taking Jordan’s position—seeing and remembering in the senses Williamson talks about are just kinds of knowledge!)
-Adam

Errol,
2) I guess I don’t know why luminosity should be correct, either. Being in a position to know that we are in a particular mental state may be a mark of mental states but I don’t know why it is always the case that we are in such a position with respect to those mental states. It’s certainly going to be interesting to see how TW argues against it, and I’ll look forward to your argument when we get there.

3) Again, I might just have poor intuitions regarding remember. I think I feel the same skepticism towards memory that you initially felt towards sight. It certainly seems like we have “false memories” that are phenomenologically indistinguishable from “true memories.” I think TW can get around this (apparent) fact, but it trips me up.

Also re: (2) I think you are right to say that one does not really hope that x wins at T if one is not at all aware of such hope at T. That seems silly.

Re: (3) When I first read the book I definitely didn’t think “see” is factive. I am still ambivalent about this, although I am more willing to accept it now. I think that a main reason why I am inclined to think that it is not factive is that I am often pulled hard by the force of scepticism, and thus am very weary of the power of our senses. TW certainly does not think this way.

I am fairly convinced, however, that “remember” is factive. 2′ seems to me to be clearly a contradiction. When you remember that x took place, x must be true and you must know x took place. It is very intuitively plausible to me that this is true (although I am having hard time constructing a good argument right now!).

Errol,

I like your formulation of the objection, and I think it’s pretty powerful.

Jordan,

Re: (2) This is a nice objection that’s similar to what I was thinking about that section.

(3) Very interesting. I’ll think more about this.

Oh, and I should note that I *am* enjoying the book, even though everything I’ve said so far has been critical…
-Adam