Comments on: Contractualism and Basic Aggregation: Part One, an overview of the debate (Cross-Listed at “Reflective Equilibrium”) http://theexcludedmiddle.wordpress.com/2007/05/22/contractualism-and-basic-aggregation-part-one-an-overview-of-the-debate-cross-listed-at-reflective-equilibrium/ 'Philosophy can at most tell us what it would be like to be rational.' Korsgaard Fri, 11 Sep 2009 15:36:18 +0000 http://wordpress.com/ hourly 1 By: Contractualism and Basic Aggregation: Part two, some solutions (X-posted at TEM) « Reflective Equilibrium http://theexcludedmiddle.wordpress.com/2007/05/22/contractualism-and-basic-aggregation-part-one-an-overview-of-the-debate-cross-listed-at-reflective-equilibrium/#comment-5 Contractualism and Basic Aggregation: Part two, some solutions (X-posted at TEM) « Reflective Equilibrium Wed, 23 May 2007 22:26:05 +0000 http://theexcludedmiddle.wordpress.com/2007/05/22/contractualism-and-basic-aggregation-part-one-an-overview-of-the-debate-cross-listed-at-reflective-equilibrium/#comment-5 [...] (X-posted at TEM) Jump to Comments What follows is the second part of the post that I started here.  As of 3.30 PST it is not it perfect shape. I will edit it later tonight.  Also, parts of this [...] [...] (X-posted at TEM) Jump to Comments What follows is the second part of the post that I started here.  As of 3.30 PST it is not it perfect shape. I will edit it later tonight.  Also, parts of this [...]

]]> By: Contractualism and Basic Aggregation: Part two, some solutions (X-posted at RE) « The Excluded Middle http://theexcludedmiddle.wordpress.com/2007/05/22/contractualism-and-basic-aggregation-part-one-an-overview-of-the-debate-cross-listed-at-reflective-equilibrium/#comment-4 Contractualism and Basic Aggregation: Part two, some solutions (X-posted at RE) « The Excluded Middle Wed, 23 May 2007 22:25:17 +0000 http://theexcludedmiddle.wordpress.com/2007/05/22/contractualism-and-basic-aggregation-part-one-an-overview-of-the-debate-cross-listed-at-reflective-equilibrium/#comment-4 [...] 23rd, 2007 · No Comments What follows is the second part of the post that I started here.  As of 3.30 PST it is not it perfect shape. I will edit it later tonight.  Also, parts of this [...] [...] 23rd, 2007 · No Comments What follows is the second part of the post that I started here.  As of 3.30 PST it is not it perfect shape. I will edit it later tonight.  Also, parts of this [...]

]]> By: Errol Lord http://theexcludedmiddle.wordpress.com/2007/05/22/contractualism-and-basic-aggregation-part-one-an-overview-of-the-debate-cross-listed-at-reflective-equilibrium/#comment-3 Errol Lord Wed, 23 May 2007 06:12:21 +0000 http://theexcludedmiddle.wordpress.com/2007/05/22/contractualism-and-basic-aggregation-part-one-an-overview-of-the-debate-cross-listed-at-reflective-equilibrium/#comment-3 Jordan, A few things: (1) I don't know exactly how contractualism is going to deal with probabilities, but this is what I am tempted to say now about your particular revision: when the probability of saving A is only slightly better than the probability of saving B, we ought to consider their claims equal. I think that 1/2 is close enough to 4/9 to do this. If we are going to say this, then we ought to say that it is permissible to save either A or B in your situation. That is not to say that saving A is not preferable. I think (and I may want to retract this later) that it is fine for contractualism to say that it is preferable to save A, yet not required. Regardless, if it is permissible to save either A or B when C is not present, it will be obligatory to save C when she is included for the same reason as Scanlon says it is. (2) It is true to say C's claim is what makes the difference, but that doesn't immediately commit you to saying that interpersonal aggregation is taking place. I think that we can say that C tips the scales without violating the individualist restriction. Jordan,

A few things:

(1) I don’t know exactly how contractualism is going to deal with probabilities, but this is what I am tempted to say now about your particular revision: when the probability of saving A is only slightly better than the probability of saving B, we ought to consider their claims equal. I think that 1/2 is close enough to 4/9 to do this. If we are going to say this, then we ought to say that it is permissible to save either A or B in your situation. That is not to say that saving A is not preferable. I think (and I may want to retract this later) that it is fine for contractualism to say that it is preferable to save A, yet not required. Regardless, if it is permissible to save either A or B when C is not present, it will be obligatory to save C when she is included for the same reason as Scanlon says it is.

(2) It is true to say C’s claim is what makes the difference, but that doesn’t immediately commit you to saying that interpersonal aggregation is taking place. I think that we can say that C tips the scales without violating the individualist restriction.

]]> By: jordandelange http://theexcludedmiddle.wordpress.com/2007/05/22/contractualism-and-basic-aggregation-part-one-an-overview-of-the-debate-cross-listed-at-reflective-equilibrium/#comment-2 jordandelange Wed, 23 May 2007 01:51:30 +0000 http://theexcludedmiddle.wordpress.com/2007/05/22/contractualism-and-basic-aggregation-part-one-an-overview-of-the-debate-cross-listed-at-reflective-equilibrium/#comment-2 I guess I'll lead off the comments (and say hello to everyone else), although I must admit up front this is outside any areas I pretend to be competent in. I think we'll have to wait until the second post to really be able to evaluate the objections, but I don't see how the first objection is clearly false. Let's say we make the situation more complex. There is a 1/2 chance that you could save A on the left, and a 4/9th chance you could save B and C on the right. Maybe we lack pretheoretic intuitions once we bring "chance" into the picture, but it seems (at least to me) that we should certainly save B and C. However, there is no level where saving A and saving B "neutralize" each other : a 1/2 chance to save A and a 4/9th chance to save B aren't equivalent, and the choice to save A is preferable. It is <i>only</i> when we add C into the picture that we see that we should instead save B (and C). In other words, neither B nor C would individually have reasonable grounds to reject choosing A, but when they are taken together they would. This seems to support Otsuka and Norcross' point, right? Anyways, once again I'm looking forward to the blog, and I hope more informed and better comments from others follow :). I guess I’ll lead off the comments (and say hello to everyone else), although I must admit up front this is outside any areas I pretend to be competent in.

I think we’ll have to wait until the second post to really be able to evaluate the objections, but I don’t see how the first objection is clearly false. Let’s say we make the situation more complex. There is a 1/2 chance that you could save A on the left, and a 4/9th chance you could save B and C on the right. Maybe we lack pretheoretic intuitions once we bring “chance” into the picture, but it seems (at least to me) that we should certainly save B and C. However, there is no level where saving A and saving B “neutralize” each other : a 1/2 chance to save A and a 4/9th chance to save B aren’t equivalent, and the choice to save A is preferable. It is only when we add C into the picture that we see that we should instead save B (and C). In other words, neither B nor C would individually have reasonable grounds to reject choosing A, but when they are taken together they would. This seems to support Otsuka and Norcross’ point, right?

Anyways, once again I’m looking forward to the blog, and I hope more informed and better comments from others follow :) .

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