Contractualism and Basic Aggregation: Part One, an overview of the debate (Cross-Listed at “Reflective Equilibrium”)

0. Let’s start by making some contractualist definitions explicit.

First, an act is wrong on contractualism if an agent can reasonably reject the inclusion of a principle allowing that act to a set of action guiding moral principles.

Second, an agent x has grounds for a reasonable rejection of a principle α if and only if α causes agent x to “fare worse” than any other agent and there is another principle, β, that does not require any agent to sacrifice as much as x does under α.

Third, Scanlon’s contractualism is committed to the individualist restriction, which states that the only reasons that can ground a reasonable rejection are reasons that particular individuals have. In other words, other considerations are not allowed to ground reasonable rejections. E.g., considerations of aggregation.

1. Next, let’s introduce the basic aggregation case:

Imagine that you are in a boat that is slowly filling with water. Equidistant from you are two other boats. In the boat to your left is A. A’s boat is quickly filling with water. Her boat will shortly go under and she will die if you do not go to save her. In the boat to your right are B and C. Their boat is filling with water at the same pace as A’s boat. Their boat will also go under shortly, and they will both die if you don’t go save them. You only have time to save either A or B&C because of your leaky boat.

Intuitively, we think that you are required to save B&C. However, it seems that, prima facie, contractualism cannot deliver this result because of the individualist restriction. That is, if we do not allow for considerations of aggregation to come into play, then it is unclear how contractualism can mandate that we save B&C.

2. Now let’s move on to Scanlon’s argument for why we are required to save B&C and let A die. Scanlon argues that if you were to save A both B and C would have grounds for a reasonable rejection. C could say, e.g., that you were not giving her due respect if you saved A. In other words, you would be neglecting important reasons for action that are derived from your obligations to her. Scanlon argues that this is true because if the case were different such that you had a choice between saving A or B (and C was not present), it would be permissible to save either A or B. In other words, you wouldn’t have decisive reason to save either of them. However, once C enters the picture things change. It is no longer permissible to save A because of the reasons that derive from C. You would be wronging C by saving A. Rahul Kumar puts it this way: there are two stages of deliberation. In the first stage, you can either go left or right. A and B neutralize each other; i.e., they cancel each other out. However, C ‘tips the scales’ such hat you must go right. After the decision has been made to go right, there is another decision, and that is whether you should save B along with C. Since it will not be any harder for you to save B, you ought to do it.

3. This argument has been attacked from many angles. I will consider three such attacks.

3.1 The first attack comes from Michael Otsuka (Alastair Norcross makes a similar point), who argues that Scanlon’s argument implicitly appeals to aggregation. He writes, “Scanlon['s] argument for saving the greater number considers C’s claim in combination with B’s claim so that they together tip the balance in favour of saving B and C” (291). In other words, Otsuka argues that Scanlon’s argument violates the individualist restriction by aggregating B and C’s claim. I think that this interpretation is clearly false. However, I will wait until part two of this post to say why.

3.2 The second attack comes from Jens Timmermann, who argues that Scanlon’s argument falters early on. Specifically, when Scanlon concludes that it would be permissible to save either A or B in the case where you can either save A or B (i.e., the case where C is not present). Timmermann writes,

“The two processes or states of affairs of A’s being saved or B’s being saved may be equivalent; but it does not follow that if you went ahead and saved either A or B you would be justified either way… This is indeed the case with two identical objects, say two precious vases; but in the case of human lives it matters greatly which way the decision goes– to A as well as to B. Their claims have the same strength, but their lives are not interchangeable. The conclusion for the case of equal claims cannot therefore be that anything goes– quite the opposite: nothing goes” (107, 108).

Timmermann is arguing here that it is not permissible to save either A or B. In other words (it is curious that he doesn’t put it this way), he thinks that if you save A, B will have a reasonable rejection of your action, and vice versa.
Once again, this objection seems to be mistaken.

3.2 The final attack that I will consider about basic aggregation is also from Timmermann, although a version of this objection is found in many places (e.g., Hirose, Taurek). He objects to later parts of Scanlon’s argument on similar grounds to his objection above. Viz., he argues that A will have grounds for a reasonable rejection of you saving B&C. Timmerman argues that, “A’s complaint will be that he never stood a chance” (ibid). Moreover, he argues that B can also complain because “the value of his life has allegedly been neutralized by the value of someone else’s life on a distant island, he is saved just because he happens to e on the same island as C” (ibid). He sums up his objection by stating, “B and C, like A and B previously [i.e., in his first objection], are considered not equal individuals, but interchangeable objects; which is precisely what persons are not” (ibid). Hence, he argues that you would be treating A like an object if you saved B&C. In fact, you would be treating B like an object as well. You would not be respecting them as people.

Timmermann argues that because of his objections we ought to abandon Scanlon’s conclusion and instead conclude that we must devise a more fair way of deciding whom to save. His proposal is called the individualist lottery. On the individualist lottery you spin a wheel that is broken up into three equal parts. One part has ‘A’ written on, one part has ‘B’, and one part has ‘C’. B and C each have a 66% chance of being saved, and A has a 33% chance of being saved. Timmermann argues that this is the only way we can give equal weight to each person’s interests.

John Taurek has a different lottery scheme in which you flip a fair coin with each side representing one of your choices. This gives everyone a 50% chance of being saved. Once again, I think that this objection is misguided, and frankly, these proposals just seem bizarre to me. Again, those remarks will wait until part two.

References:

Scanlon, T.M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

–. (2003) The Difficulty of Tolerance. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Otsuka, Michael. (2000). “Scanlon and the claims of the many versus the one.” Analysis, 60.3, pp. 288-293.

Timmermann, Jens. (2004). “The Individualist lotter: how people count, but not their numbers.” Analysis, 64.2, pp. 106-112.

Kumar, Rahul. (2001). “Contractualism on saving the many.” Analysis, 61.2, pp. 165-170.

~ by Errol Lord on May 22, 2007.